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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v. : 
DAVE ORTIZ, : Case No. 920563-CA 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred oit the court pursuant to Utah Code 
I ! "i 11 a 
circuit court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final order a misdemeanor offense n this case 
rionorable I 3 oy d Gowans : r 
Sal Lake County, State Utah, rendered final judgment and 
conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
R U L E S # S T A T p T E S Mjm C 0 N S T I T 0 T I 0 N A L p R 0 V I S I 0 N S 
The pertinent parts ot the following rules, statutes and 
coi is tji tu t:i <::: i ita ] pr c:>i i i si oi is a r e pi: ::> s r:i ded :ii i i Addendum,. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1953 as amended); 
Amendment IV, United States Constitution 
Article I, §§ 7 and 14, Utah Constitution 
Utah Rules of Evidence 601, 701 
Salt Lake City Code § 12.36.040 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Did the officer stop Mr. Ortiz based on an illegal 
pretext to search :.. evidence a more serious crime. 
Standard of Review: "Whether a traffic stop was an 
unconstitutional "pretext" stop requires a legal conclusion— 
thus we review it for "correctness." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 
1040, 1044 (Utah App. 1992) 
1 
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II. Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. 
Ortiz. 
Standard of Review: The determination as to whether probable 
cause to arrest exists is a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness. The factual determinations 
underlying the legal conclusions are given deference and 
subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah App. 1991); Beck v. 
Ohio. 379 U.S. 89f 92-3, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On July 15, 1992 Judge Floyd H. Gowans heard Dave C. Ortiz' 
(hereafter Ortiz) motion to suppress evidence obtained following 
his stop by a Salt Lake City police officer. See Motion to Suppress 
Transcript (hereafter Tr.) Ortiz argued that the stop was 
pretextual and the detention was without reasonable suspicion. Tr. 
20 The trial court denied the motion. (A copy of the trial judge's 
oral findings and conclusions are attached as addendum B) . On July 
23, 1992 Mr. Ortiz entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), reserving the right 
to appeal the issues raised at the suppression hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of February 28, 1992 at approximately 8:45 
p.m., Officer Michael Beasley stopped two individuals of Mexican 
descent in a 1983 Buick LeSabre. (Tr. 1, 2, 12, 13). In addition 
to the officer, Calvin Sandoval, a passenger in Mr. Ortiz's car, 
testified at the motion to suppress hearing. Mr. Sandoval, 
testified that on the evening in question he and Mr. Ortiz left Mr. 
Ortiz' home and proceeded immediately to the area of arrest 
(Westbound on 100 South) and at no time did they entered the 76 
2 
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club parking lot or pulled out of that parking lot. (Tr. 9-10, 13). 
As they turned left into a 45 degree angle parking space at the 
side of the road, across the street from the 76 Club, Mr. Ortiz 
reduced his rate of speed and signaled. At the time Mr. Ortiz 
executed the turn his car was the only vehicle on the road. (Tr. 
11, 12, 14). Just prior to turning into the parking space Mr. 
Sandoval noticed that across the street behind the 76 club was the 
reflection from a motorcycle headli glit (Tr. 11, ] 4 , • II 6) Only 
after their vehicle was stopped in the parking place did the 
officer approach the car with his motorcycle. (Tr. 11) Mr. 
Sandoval was familiar with the area, having ] i ved I n the immediate 
vicinity for 6 months and driven through the intersection at which 
the stop occurred more than once a week during that time. (Tr. 11, 
12) Mr. Sandoval had only 1 beer on the evening in question. (Tr. 
14). 
Officer Beasley testified that hie stopped Mr Ortiz for 
impeding traffic, however, no citation was issued and he could not 
remember if he might have told Mr. Ortiz that he was stopping him 
for making a U turn. (Tr. 7, 8) His testimony regarding Mr, Ortiz' 
driving pattern, which constituted the offense for which the stop 
occurred was varied and contradictory. Specifically the officer 
stated: "Mr. Ortiz pulled across the street southbound, blew across 
100 South southbound," "Mr. Ortiz' vehicle was had stopped in the 
lane, the travel lane of which I was In," "he was backing...just 
backing slowly," "I just saw him in motion slowly driving across 
the roadway," and finally, the officer conceded that Mr. Ortiz had 
3 
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not been backing across the street at all, but rather pulling 
foreword across the street. (Tr. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 18). The officer 
indicated that he did not see Mr. Ortiz exit the 76 Club parking 
area and after reviewing his report changed his testimony to say 
that he had seen Mr. Ortiz exit the parking area (Tr. 6-7). The 
officer's testimony was further inconsistent in that he testified 
that Mr. Ortiz told him he was coming from the 76 club and later 
conceded that Mr. Ortiz had in fact told him that he was coming 
from his home. (Tr. 6-7). The officer arrested Mr. Ortiz based on 
information obtained following the stop. (Tr. 19) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Beasley used the allegation that Mr. Ortiz was 
impeding traffic as a pretext to stop and search for evidence of a 
more serious crime, specifically that Mr. Ortiz was driving under 
the influence of alcohol. This stop was in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I §§7 and 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The trial court/s finding that Officer Beasley's reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Ortiz was impeding traffic was clearly 
erroneous. The officer's testimony was internally inconsistent and 
contradicted by that of witness Calvin Sandoval. Therefore, the 
officer lacked reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ortiz was engage in a 
criminal act and the stop of his vehicle was in violation of his 
Article I, §§ 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitution and Utah Code Ann. 77-
7-2 (1953 as amended). 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
p 0 I N T lm T j i e officer stopped Mr. Ortiz based on an illegal 
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime, thus 
violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I §§ 7 and 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The stop of a vehicle and detention ol its occupants is a 
seizure within the definition of the fourth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I §14 of 
the Utah Constitution, giving rise to I he right to be tree from 
unreasonable search and seizure. Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 
653 (1979); Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Ut. App. 1992) Therefore, 
a stop of a vehicle "must comport with the constitutional 
protection afforded by the fourth amendment" as well as those of 
Article I §§14 and 7 of the Utah Constitution, an officer must have 
reasonable suspicion that a crime was or had occurred prior to a 
traffic stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App 1988); 
See also. State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991); Utah Code Ann. 77-7-2 (1952 as 
amended). The determination of whether an officer had reasonable 
suspicion to stop an individual is based on the "totality of the 
circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the 
seizure....the officer is entitled to assess the facts facing him 
(or her) in light of his experience, (citations omitted) Sierra, at 
975. 
An officer may stop an individual for a traffic code 
violation, however, he may not use such a violation as a pretext to 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
search for evidence of a more serious crime. State v. Parker. 834 
P.2d 592 (1992), Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977. 
In Utah, the pretext doctrine applies in cases where an 
officer claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor 
traffic violation, but where the court determines the 
stop was not made because of the traffic violation but 
rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and, 
therefore, the officer has deviated from the normal 
course of action expected of a reasonable officer. 
Lopez. 831 P.2d at 1043, See also. United States v. Guzman. 864 
P.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988). This doctrine prevents abuse of 
exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, protects 
citizens from arbitrary actions by police officers, supports the 
fourth amendment's requirement of objective reasonableness to 
support any invasion by law enforcement, See Maryland v. Macon. 472 
U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985); Scott v. United 
States. 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978) and 
requires courts to focus on the realities of police practices —not 
pretenses— thus protecting the integrity of the courts. See 
United States v. Keller. 499 F.Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. 111. 1980), 
State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990). "Allowing police 
officers to stop vehicles for any minor violation when the officer 
in fact is pursuing a hunch would allow officers to seize almost 
any individual on the basis of otherwise unconstitutional 
objectives To permit police officers to use any minor traffic 
violation as a pretext to stop a vehicle encourages the selective 
enforcement of traffic regulations against minorities..." Lopez. 
831 P.2d at 1045, 1046. 
This court has held that the standard for determinations of 
6 
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reasonable suspicion is "the totality of the circumstances." 
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977. The subjective intent of the officer is 
irrelevant in making these determinations. Id. The only question 
is "...whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in 
the absence of illegitimate motivation." Id. at 978 (quoting 
United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986). This 
standard "provides [for] meaningful judicial review of 
discretionary police action." Guzman. 864 P.2d at 1517. 
In the present case two Mexican individuals in a mid-size car 
on the West side of Salt Lake City near a bar were stopped at 
approximately 8:45 p.m. for allegedly impeding traffic when the car 
stopped slowly crossed the street into a 45 degree angle parking 
space on the side of the road. The only traffic was the officer 
conducting the stop. (Tr. 1, 2, 12, 13).1 
Utah's appellate courts have on three occasions held that 
reasonable suspicion was not present in cases in which a slow rate 
of speed by the suspect's vehicle was an element of the officers 
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. State v. Carpena, 714 
P.2d 674 (Utah 1986)(a slow moving car with out-of- state plates 
driving through an area where frequent burglaries occurred at 3 
a.m. was not sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion) ; State v. 
Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) (officer stopped a vehicle 
1
 The race of Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Sandoval is relevant in the 
present case because, as this court has noted "many pretext stop 
cases involve minorities...We are mindful that law enforcement 
officials often use racial characteristics as a basis for "hunch" 
criminal profiles in pretextual traffic stops." Lopezf 831 P.2d at 
1046, See also Arrovo. 770 P.2d at 155. 
7 
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for violating Utah law requiring slower vehicles in the left lane 
to yield to traffic approaching from behind was not sufficient 
basis for reasonable suspicion to stop.)? State v. Thorsness, 778 
P.2d 1011 (stopping a vehicle traveling 20 mph in a 40 mph zone 
late at night did not constitute reasonable suspicion that a crime 
was occurring. While impeding traffic was not specific alleged in 
any of the above cases, in each case the vehicles were traveling 
slower that the approaching officer thus, the driving patterns were 
similar and logical consequence of driving slowly would be impeding 
traffic. The court's must avoid placing form over substance and 
look to the actual facts of the case and not the label placed on 
the driving pattern by an officer who is trained to providing the 
proper label to justify a stop. As in Thorsness. Carpena, Sierra, 
Mr. Ortiz was merely driving slowly and approaching a parking place 
with caution. See Supra 12. 
The totality of the circumstances in the present case indicate 
that the officer's allegation of impeding traffic was a pretext in 
which the officer could use to investigate whether two Hispanic 
individuals on the westside of Salt Lake City, in the vicinity of 
a bar, late at night were driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. 
POINT II: Mr. Ortiz' detention by the officer was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion violating the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I §§ 
7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing the trial court 
found that the officer testified "that a vehicle whether it's 
backing, moving in a forward direction or making a turn or coming 
8 
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straight out of a parking lot any of those maneuvers would be legal 
assuming that there's no traffic on the road with which it would 
interfere." (Tr. 24) The trail judge went on to state, 
"we're looking at questions of fact, but a vehicle 
stopping in that position as has been testified to by the 
officer certainly would be far more than probable cause. 
The officer would be derelict in his duty if he did not 
investigate to see what was wrong. It has nothing to do 
with whether the individual is intoxicated. It may be a 
serious ill person, it may be an incompetent driver, it 
may be a person who doesn't know how to drive. There's 
many reasons why a vehicle would pull into a position 
like that and then stop and so looking at the testimony 
from the officer's position he would have been derelict 
in his duty had he not investigated2... .Now opposing 
that is Mr. I'm sorry I've forgotten the gentleman's name 
but the witness, his testimony that they came from a 
different direction, that they were performing a 
different maneuver and that the officer wasn't driving 
down the street. That's a question of fact and therefore 
the motion to suppress is denied." 
(Tr.25)3 These brief findings neglect to address the officer's 
2
 The trail judge found that there were many reasons that a 
vehicle would stop in the road as the officer alleged that Mr. 
Ortiz did, all requiring that an officer stop and investigate. 
However, absent reasonable suspicion that a crime has been 
committed or an emergency an officer has no right to stop a 
vehicle. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043. In the present case there was no 
evidence that the officer suspected that there was an emergency 
situation or an incompetent driver. 
3
 In the case of State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-789 
(Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial 
court for more detailed findings regarding the conflict in 
testimony concerning the seizure of a defendant. As the Supreme 
Court noted issues of search and seizure are highly fact sensitive 
and detailed findings "are necessary to enable this court to 
meaningfully review the issues on appeal." Id, at 789. In 
the present case the trial court made no factual findings regarding 
the conflicting testimony of Mr. Sandoval and the officer. The 
extent of the trial court's ruling on this matter consisted of the 
following, "Now opposing that is Mr. I'm sorry I've forgotten the 
gentleman's name but the witness, his testimony that they came form 
a different direction that they were performing a different 
maneuver and that the officer wasn't driving down the street. 
That's a question of fact and therefore the motion to suppress is 
9 
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frequent internal inconsistencies in his testimony and ongoing 
correction of his testimony to bring it in line with the statements 
documented in his police report. In contrast to the officer's 
testimony Mr. Sandoval's testimony had no inconsistencies, was 
presented in a clear manner, he did not refer to any written notes 
to correct his testimony, was unwavering in his presentation of the 
facts and testified that he had only one beer, thus, it is unlikely 
that his perception of the evenings events was not impaired by 
alcohol. 
Testimony of an officer concerning facts within the realm of 
common knowledge to the average individual, such as where the 
officer's vehicle was in relation to Mr. Ortiz' car, should not be 
given more weight based on the mere fact that the witness is an 
officer. It is true that on the issue of reasonable suspicion the 
officer's testimony as to what a reasonable officer is to be given 
weight over that of a lay witness, but this deference does not 
extend to facts that are within realm of a lay witness. See, 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; Utah Rules of Evidence 601, 701. 
The officer's changing testimony4 indicates that the officer 
denied." It appears that the trial court did not consider any 
conflict because the issue is factual and not legal. However, 
issues of reasonable suspicion and pretext doctrine are highly 
fact sensitive questions in which the trial court must make 
determination of fact on which to base the legal conclusion. Id. 
789. For these reasons of it is appropriate that this Court remand 
this case for specific factual findings. 
4
 Specific examples of the officer changing and 
contradictory testimony include that fact that Mr. Ortiz was 
stopped for impeding traffic, however, no citation was issued and 
the officer could not remember if he might have told Mr. Ortiz that 
he was stopping him for making a U turn. (Tr. 7,8) In discussing 
10 
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was merely looking for a valid legal reason to substantiate the 
stop after the fact. In light of the apparent failure to consider 
or give the testimony of Mr. Sandoval due weight the trial court's 
finding that the officer stopped Mr. Ortiz because he was impeding 
traffic, specifically himself is clearly erroneous. 
The testimony presented at suppression hearing supports Mr. 
Ortiz' position that the officer alleged the impeding violation 
only after making the stop and determining that Mr. Ortiz was 
intoxicated. Specifically, Mr. Ortiz was not charge with impeding 
traffic, however, the charge of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol the officer charged him with the lesser offense of having 
an Open . Container of Alcohol in a Vehicle. (Information) 
Supporting the premiss that the officer did not merely give Mr. 
Ortiz a break by citing him only with the principle offense. 
A search of Utah case law revealed no cases addressing the 
issue of reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on impeding 
traffic, however, in Sandy City v. Thorsness. 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah 
App. 1989) this court held that stopping a vehicle for driving at 
Mr. Ortiz' driving pattern the officer testified: "Mr. Ortiz pulled 
across the street southbound, blew across 100 South southbound," 
"Mr. Ortiz' vehicle was had stopped in the lane, the travel lane of 
which I was in," "he was backing.. .just backing slowly," "I just 
saw him in motion slowly driving across the roadway," and finally, 
the officer conceded that Mr. Ortiz had not been backing across the 
street at all, but rather pulling foreword across the street. (Tr. 
2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 18). He also indicated that he did not see Mr. 
Ortiz exit the 76 Club parking area and after reviewing his report 
changed his testimony to say that he had seen Mr. Ortiz exit the 
parking area (Tr. 6-7). Finally, the officer was inconsistent in 
first testifying that Mr. Ortiz told him he was coming from the 76 
club and later conceded that Mr. Ortiz had in fact told him that he 
was coming from his home. (Tr. 6-7). 
11 
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a slow rate of speed was insufficient basis for to stop a vehicle. 
See Supra 12. In Thorsness the vehicle in question proceeded at 
twenty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour zone. In that case 
this court noted, "Defendant did not commit any traffic violations 
and traffic was not impeded as there was none in the area at that 
hour.11 Thorsness, 778 P.2d at 1012. At first appearance the 
present case appears to be distinguishable from Thorsness based on 
the finding that no traffic was impeded. However, if the specific 
facts of each case are considered and not the labels given the 
driving patterns by the testifying officers the similarities are 
striking. As in Thorsness the only vehicles on the road were 
defendant's and the officer's, it was late evening in both cases 
and both cars were proceeding at a slow rate of speed. The 
difference in the two cases lies in the labeling of the facts by 
Officer Beasley thus, clouding the issue of whether a reasonable 
officer would have stopped Mr. Ortiz for impeding traffic. As in 
Thorsness, Mr. Ortiz was merely proceeding at a slow rate of speed, 
however, he had the logical explanation that he was attempting to 
park his vehicle. In Thorsness this court found no reasonable 
suspicion to stop the defendant even absent an explanation for his 
driving pattern, for these reasons there was no legitimate basis 
for the stop of Mr. Ortiz' vehicle. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the officer was in fact stopped in 
the roadway while Mr. Ortiz executed his turn into the 45 degree 
angle parking space for several seconds, this still does not raise 
to the level of a traffic violation. (Tr. 2, 11-12). Salt Lake 
12 
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City Code §12.36.040 provides, 
No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such slow speed 
as to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement 
of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for 
safe operation or to comply with law.(Emphasis added) 
In the present case Mr. Ortiz was merely operating his vehicle 
within the exception to the code section, "when... necessary for 
safe operation." It is unrealistic and unsafe to assume that an 
individual pulling off a roadway and into a 45 degree angle parking 
space at the side of the road would not substantially slow the 
speed of the vehicle. Even the officer conceded that this would be 
an appropriate action. (Tr. 19). 
The allegation of impeding traffic when only the officer is on 
the street creates a catchall traffic violation in which an officer 
can allege any time he has a hunch and wishes to further 
investigate an individual, opening the door for the officers use of 
his discretionary power to violate individuals constitutional 
rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial absent the 
illegally seized evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of January, 1993. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their i*: 
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreal 
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, as: 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cau* 
supported bv Oath or affirmation, and particular!) 
describing the place to be searched, and the per>on» 
or things to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. im* 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbiddi-n _ 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in ih#-ir j^.r 
sons, houses, papers and effects against u n r e a - , ^ 
searches and seizures shall not be violated. .:r.d
 n, 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cau— -u. 
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly de-eni.:n. 
the place to be searched, and the person or thmj i«, ^ 
seized.
 I%l 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES. 
Rule 601. General rule of competency. 
(a) General rule of competency. Even* person is 
competent to be a witness except as otherwise pro* 
vided in these rules. 
(b) Statement of declarant in action for his 
wrongful death. Evidence of a statement by the de-
ceased is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if 
offered against the plaintiff in an action for wrongful 
death. 
(o Statement of decedent offered in action 
against his estate. 
(1) Evidence of a statement is not made inad-
missible by the hearsay rule when offered in an 
action upon a claim or demand against the estate 
of the declarant if the statement was made upon 
the personal knowledge of the declarant at a time 
when the matter had been recently perceived by 
him and while his recollection was clear. 
(2) Evidence of a statement is inadmissible un-
der this section if the statement was made under 
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of 
trustworthiness. 
ARTICLE VII. OPLNIONS AND EXPERT 
TESTIMONY. 
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
T7-7-2. By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under author-
ity of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a 
person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or at-
tempted in the presence of any peace officer, 
"presence" includes all of the physical senses or 
any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, 
or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a 
felony has been committed and has reasonable 
cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe 
the person has committed a public offense, and 
there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the com-
mission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage prop-
erty belonging to another person. 1986 
12.36.030 DRIVING TOO SLOW. 
No person snail arive a motor vehicle at S-JCT slow s;>e*fl as - 3 , „ ™ . 
or OIOCK :.ne normal ana reasonable novtnent f r a ^ c xc
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this motorcycle parks in that neighborhood never west of 9th 
as the officer testified to. What we really have to look at is 
did the officer have an articulable reason to stop this vehicle. 
The answer is yes. This car stopped in front of him. Stayed there 
for several seconds by his testimony. Where Ms. Mendez is getting 
the sketchy elements from this report confuses me because the report 
is very clear. It doesn't talk about backing. Officer Beasley did 
make that mistake in his testimony. It does talk about this car 
pulling slowly across the lane of traffic, impeding his progress to 
the extent that he had to come to a complete stop and wait while the 
pulled out of the way. That's all that's required for him to go up 
and begin his conversation with him. At that point we'll take that 
up at the court or at the trial, but up to that point he has every 
reason and every reasonable officer would be expected to make 
contact who has just stopped and caused traffic to stop. 
JUDGE: What we have here is obviously a question of fact. The 
officer has testified and our standard in this proceeding is 
probable cause. The officer's testified that a vehicle 
ATD: Excuse me your honor, I believe that the standard would be 
a reasonable suspicion to stop. I'm not challenging the arrest but 
rather the stop. 
ATP: That is correct which is a lower standard. 
ATD: I just want the record to be accurate. 
ATP: And I believe that is correct. The standard in Utah right 
now is reasonable suspicion to stop. 
F: 
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jTJDGE: Or probable cause. 
ATP: Or probable cause to arrest. 
JUDGE: Ya, that's what I said. He has testified that a vehicle 
whether it's backing, moving in a forward direction or making a turn 
or coming straight out of a parking lot any of those maneuvers would 
be legal assuming that there's no traffic on the road with which it 
would interfere. He has testified that when it gets into his lane 
of traffic that the vehicle stops and sits there. He pulls up and 
stops. The vehicle then either backs or goes forward again onto the 
curb. Now certainly a vehicle stopping in that position again, as 
I've said, we're looking at questions of fact, but a vehicle 
stopping in that position as has been testified to by the officer 
certainly would be far more than probable cause. The officer would 
be derelict in his duty if he did not investigate to see what was 
wrong. It has nothing to do with whether the individual is 
intoxicated. It may be a serious ill person, it may be an 
incompetent drive, it may be a person who doesn't know how to 
drive. There's many reasons why a vehicle would pull into a 
position like that and then stop and so looking at the testimony 
from the officer's position he would have been derelict in his duty 
had he not investigated. And of course the Parker case is not 
applicable because obviously a DUI arrest and looking for a burglary 
suspect are two different matters. The officer becomes aware in 
most cases of a DUI offense when he approaches the driver and finds 
out the driver's condition. That's something entirely different 
than in a burglary case. And so at the time of the stop it's not 
- 24 -
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expected necessarily that you will escalate a matter into a DUI 
offense. That happens just from further observations. Now opposing 
that is Mr. I'm sorry I've forgotten the gentleman's name but the 
witness, his testimony that they came from a different direction 
that they were performing a different maneuver and that the officer 
wasn't driving down the street. That's a question of fact and 
therefore the motion to suppress is denied. 
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